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Abstract. Murrow and Murrow offer a novel account of dehumanization, by synthesizing 
data which suggest that where subject S has a dehumanized view of group G, S‘s neural 
mechanisms of empathy show a dampened response to the suffering of members of G, and 
S‘s judgments about the humanity of members of G are largely non-conscious. Here I ex-
amine Murrow and Murrow‘s suggestions about how identity-based hate speech bears 
responsibility for dehumanization in the first place. I identify a distinction between (i) 
accounts of the nature of the harm effected by identity prejudice, and (ii) accounts of how 
hate speech contributes to the harms of identity prejudice. I then explain why Murrow 
and Murrow‘s proposal is more aptly construed as an account of type (i), and explain why 
accounts of this type, even if they‘re plausible and evidentially well-supported, have lim-
ited implications in relation to justifications for anti-hate speech law. 
 
1. Introduction 
Gail Murrow and Richard Murrow examine the phenomenon of dehumanization, 
by which they mean the thing that occurs when a subject, S, perceives people who 
belong to some cultural outgroup, G, as having a lesser degree of humanity than 
herself and others she identifies with.1 Their inquiry is partly motivated by the 
conjecture – which they credit to the psychologist Gordon Allport, and the phi-
losopher Hannah Arendt – that dehumanization can lead to mass, ethnically-mo-
                                                          
1 Gail B. Murrow and Richard Murrow, A hypothetical neurological association between dehumanization and human 
rights abuses, JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE BIOSCIENCES (2015), 1-29 (doi: 10.1093/jlb/lsv015). 
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tivated human rights abuses, like those of the Holocaust. The principal contribu-
tion of their article is to articulate a more detailed (hypothetical) account of how 
dehumanization alters the cognition of affected subjects, which they do by syn-
thesizing contemporary findings in neuroscientific research on empathy and psy-
chological research on prejudice. They contend that where subject S has a dehu-
manized view of group G, S’s neural mechanisms of empathy exhibit a dampened 
response to the suffering of members of G, and S’s judgments, vis-à-vis the degree 
of humanity of members of G, are largely non-conscious, i.e. not a product of S’s 
conscious beliefs, but rather a product of S’s conditioned associations connecting 
G to sub-human traits. If this is how dehumanization works then it’s plain to see 
why it’s so dangerous. Affected subjects feel less disquiet about certain people’s 
suffering, and consequently they’re less averse to inflicting or permitting that suf-
fering, and these dispositions are difficult to modify, because they’re borne of sub-
jects’ implicit associations and not their conscious beliefs. Dehumanization, thus 
characterized, is a phenomenon that societies should take urgent measures to 
counteract, even at some cost to other values.     
In what follows I’ll provisionally grant Murrow and Murrow’s account of how 
dehumanization operates once it’s in effect. What I want to examine are the ram-
ifications they seek to trace from this for questions about the legitimacy of laws 
restricting hate speech, i.e. speech that expresses or incites hatred towards people 
on the basis of some aspect of their identity, e.g. their ethnicity, nationality, or 
religion. Murrow and Murrow don’t claim to be advancing a justification for gen-
eral prohibitions on hate speech; what they purport to offer, rather, is a “theory 
regarding how hate speech might be threatening to its targets in ways which ju-
rists, scholars, and scientists have not perhaps previously been aware.”2 They 
summarize the part of their account that’s relevant in connection with this con-
cern as follows: 
If hate speech conditions… an implicitly dehumanized view of its human tar-
gets, and, if this reduces empathy for targets that motivates prosocial behavior 
toward them, then, in legal terms, it also reduces the sense of equality that 
conspecifics have toward the targets and thus deprives the latter of equal pro-
tection of their rights, which is provided not simply by positive law, but by 
the capacity to provoke empathy. Therefore… it may pose a true threat to such 
targeted groups’ safety or human rights.3 
Here I’ll question whether Murrow and Murrow’s account of dehumanization in 
fact has the implications for anti-hate speech law that they suggest. I’ll begin by 
sketching different candidate justifications for different kinds of anti-hate speech 
laws, and indicating the point at which an account like Murrow and Murrow’s 
has the potential to make an impact on the case for anti-hate speech law. I’ll then 
                                                          
2 Ibid, 19. 
3 Ibid, 19. 
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outline the views advanced by other scholars interested in the malign effects of 
identity-prejudicial speech, and in so doing flesh-out a distinction that becomes 
salient in examining such views – one that’s also crucial for an assessment of Mur-
row and Murrow’s proposal – between (i) accounts of the nature of the harm ef-
fected by identity-prejudice, and (ii) accounts of how hate speech contributes to 
the harms of identity-prejudice. I’ll then explain why Murrow and Murrow’s pro-
posal is properly construed as an account of type (i), and explain why accounts 
of this type, even if they’re plausible and evidentially well-supported, have limited 
ramifications in relation to justifications for anti-hate speech law. 
 
2. Two justificatory approaches to anti-hate speech law 
We should denounce the views of people who express identity-prejudicial senti-
ments, but we shouldn’t legally restrict such expression except in cases where it 
does a discernible, non-trivial harm to some identifiable victim/s. This premise 
isn’t predicated upon a commitment to any strong free speech principle, of the 
kind that underpins American First Amendment jurisprudence, and towards 
which Murrow and Murrow (and many others) are sceptical. Rather, to say that 
we should only penalise harmful hate speech is just to accept the tenet that the 
law should be used to remedy harms done to others, not to censure pernicious 
attitudes or penalise wrongs per se. I’ll assume that tenet henceforth, without any 
defence except to observe that hate speech is one area of law in which non-harm-
based justifications are especially at risk of devolving into expedient scapegoat-
ing. Assuming that hate speech may only be restricted when it harms others, it’s 
then important to distinguish between: 
(i) Putative justifications for anti-hate speech law which claim that specific acts 
of hate speech cause harm to others; and 
(ii) Putative justifications which claim that, in general, hate speech contributes 
to harm to others. 
Vis-à-vis (i), someone might claim that being confronted with face-to-face hate 
speech can cause distress of a magnitude sufficient to qualify as psychological 
harm (‘cause’ in a counterfactual sense, i.e. but for the relevant acts, the harm 
wouldn’t have occurred). If this claim is evidentially well-supported, it seems suf-
ficient to justify, in principle, an anti-hate speech statute narrowly aimed at re-
stricting instances of hate speech that inflict the relevant harms. By contrast, vis-
à-vis (ii), someone might claim that all hate speech – even where it isn’t counter-
factually responsible for harming others – contributes to the existence of de facto 
social hierarchies which inflict harm upon targets of group-based identity-preju-
dice. What does ‘contribute to’ mean here? Roughly, the idea is that eliminating 
hate speech would increase the likelihood of the de facto social hierarchies being 
eradicated, but that holding other factors constant, this intervention alone 
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wouldn’t be sufficient to eradicate the hierarchies. Claims along these lines are 
much harder to substantiate, but if one were well-supported, it would seem suf-
ficient to justify – again, at least in principle – a broad-scope statute aimed at 
legally restricting all instances of hate speech. 
Claims of the type that are necessary to underwrite the first type of putative jus-
tification for anti-hate speech law are highly plausible. Only the most extreme 
free speech zealot would deny that some hate speech can do some harm to some of 
its targets.4 Granted, there’s room for disagreement about how exactly we should 
formulate laws restricting such directly harmful hate speech. Nonetheless, the 
more significant question about the in-principle justifiability of anti-hate speech 
law is whether any putative justification for restrictions of the second type can 
be sustained, e.g. whether it’s plausible to say that instances of hate speech that 
are individually harmless nevertheless contribute to some sort of socially-medi-
ated harm, in a way that renders all hate speech legitimately liable to legal re-
striction. If Murrow and Murrow’s account of how dehumanization operates has 
any impact to make on the case in favour of anti-hate speech law, those debates 
are the place in which its conclusions need to register. 
 
3. Two elements in an adequate account of speech-harm 
In the literature on identity-prejudicial speech and its malign effects, we observe 
efforts to describe both (i) the nature of the harm that such speech (allegedly) 
contributes to, and (ii) the route via which such speech (allegedly) makes its con-
tribution. Where a putative justification for anti-hate speech law is purporting 
to show that all hate speech contributes to a socially-mediated harm, an account 
needs to be given in regards to both points. A quick sketch of some prominent 
recent work in the legal philosophical literature on identity-prejudicial speech 
will illuminate the nature of this demand that I’m outlining. 
So, for example, in philosophical and legal theoretic work on the silencing effects 
of sexist expression, we get (i) an account of the nature of a certain kind of harm 
– namely, people being rendered unable to perform important speech acts that 
they intend to perform, i.e. suffering illocutionary disablement – and (ii) an account 
of the route via which sexist expression makes a crucial contribution to that harm 
                                                          
4 Having said that, I should acknowledge that what’s sometimes called the ‘sticks and stones’ view – 
roughly, the view that speech is ostensibly harmless, irrespective of the purposes to which it’s being put 
– has rather too often been taken seriously in the literature. A significant part of the contribution made 
in early, influential work on hate speech by critical race theorists – e.g. Mari J. Matsuda, Public response to 
racist speech: considering the victim’s story, and Charles R. Lawrence, If he hollers let him go: regulating racist speech 
on campus, both in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1993) – was to provide detailed analyses of the very 
significant forms of psychological harm inflicted by various kinds of face-to-face hate speech. For the 
definitive, sustained critique of the sticks and stones view, see Susan J. Brison, Speech, harm, and the mind-
body problem in First Amendment jurisprudence, LEGAL THEORY 4 (1998), 39-61. 
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– namely, by subverting certain key audience expectations which need to be in 
place in order for the important speech acts in question to be reliably and suc-
cessfully performed.5 
Or, in Jeremy Waldron’s work on hate speech, we get (i) an account of the nature 
of a certain kind of harm – namely, people’s losing their sense of assurance that 
they are fully socially enfranchised members of their society – and (ii) an account 
of the route via which racist expression makes a crucial contribution to that harm 
– namely, by making it unavoidably salient to people in targeted outgroups that 
they are held in contempt by others in their society.6 
Or, in Jason Stanley’s work on propaganda, we get (i) an account of the nature of 
a certain kind of harm – namely, disadvantage stemming from systematic iden-
tity-based discrimination across multiple areas of social policy – and (ii) an ac-
count of the route via which a certain form of racist propaganda makes a key con-
tribution to that harm – namely, by effectively misrepresenting systematically 
identity-prejudicial practices as if they were egalitarian and meritocratic.7 
Although the proponents of these accounts hold different views about the justi-
fiability of legally restricting the expressive practices they’re examining, each of 
them supplies the elements that would be needed in order to formulate a case for 
restriction. In each account we get an analysis of the nature of a complex socially-
mediated harm, plus an explanation of how the conditions that facilitate the harm 
are created and sustained, and – crucially – this explanation is one that indicates 
how the relevant form of expression might be effecting an identifiable, distinct, 
and important contribution to those conditions. If Murrow and Murrow’s analy-
sis of dehumanization is to be usefully employed in an argument for anti-hate 
speech law, it likewise needs to supply each of these elements. 
 
  
                                                          
5 Key works include: Jennifer Hornsby, Disempowered speech, PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS 23 (1995), 127-48; Rae 
Langton, Subordination, silence, and pornography’s authority in Robert C. Post (Ed.), CENSORSHIP AND 
SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the 
History of Art and the Humanities, 1998); Ishani Maitra, Silencing speech, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF 
PHILOSOPHY 39 (2009), 309-38.  
6 Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
7 Jason Stanley, How Propaganda Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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4. Dehumanization: its operations and its origins 
Murrow and Murrow’s paper does supply the first of these elements; it presents 
an account of the nature of a complex, socially-mediated harm. What their dis-
cussion doesn’t supply is an explanation of why we should suppose that hate 
speech makes a crucial contribution to that harm. The mere fact that there exist 
instances of hate speech which manifest the speaker’s dehumanized view of a cer-
tain group doesn’t suffice to bridge this argumentative gap. Obviously people 
sometimes say things that overtly or covertly betray a view of groups as essen-
tially sub-human. But the question that matters for our purposes here is whether 
such expressions are actually responsible, by themselves or alongside other fac-
tors, for non-trivial numbers of people coming to accept a dehumanized view of 
others. 
I don’t think we’re in a position to speak confidently in the affirmative. Even if we 
could show that the incidence of dehumanizing attitudes and dehumanizing hate 
speech reliably co-vary across cultural and historical circumstances, this still 
wouldn’t reveal which way the causal arrows point. Maybe an increase in dehu-
manizing hate speech in public discourse is responsible for an increase in people’s 
having dehumanized views; but then maybe dehumanizing attitudes flourish in a 
political milieu for other reasons, and they are a cause, rather than a consequence, 
of increases in dehumanizing hate speech in public discourse. Or alternatively – 
probably this is the safest conjecture to advance from the armchair – the causal 
arrows criss-cross in multiple directions simultaneously. In any case, if we have 
credible alternative hypotheses about what could be the crucial contributing fac-
tors in the inculcation of dehumanizing attitudes (and we clearly do have such 
hypotheses to consider, e.g. historical enmities, short-term conflicts borne of eco-
nomic crises, innate tendencies towards ethnic outgroup enmity, various combi-
nations of the above), then it’s conjectural to attribute a proliferation of dehu-
manized attitudes to the influence of hate speech. Granted, there is work in social 
psychology that aims to shift questions about hate speech’s effects away from the 
realms of intractable sociological speculation, into more controlled experimental 
conditions,8 but the all-things-considered implications of this work are, I think 
it’s fair to say, uncertain. 
The natural reply to this, for Murrow and Murrow, is to reiterate that they only 
ever promised an account of how hate speech threatens its targets in ways jurists 
and scholars haven’t paid close attention to previously. But that is, I’d contend, a 
subtle mischaracterization of what their analysis can and does achieve. Having 
                                                          
8 See for example the products of the research program pursued by the late Brian Mullen and collaborators 
at the University of Syracuse, e.g. Brian Mullen and Diana R. Rice, Ethnophaulisms and exclusion: the behav-
ioural consequences of cognitive representation of ethnic immigrant groups, PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
BULLETIN 29 (2003), 1056-67. 
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advanced an explanation of how dehumanization works and why it’s so danger-
ous (by my lights, one that’s plausible on both fronts) what their account entails 
for political practice really ought to be described schematically. Dehumanization 
carries significant threats to people’s basic rights, which (arguably) have previ-
ously been underappreciated, and therefore the acts or practices that make a sig-
nificant contribution to dehumanization – whatever those acts may be, precisely – en-
danger people’s rights in a way that calls for an urgent response. Murrow and 
Murrow’s account tells us something noteworthy about dehumanization’s dan-
gers, but rather less about its originating sources. 
 
5. Danger, urgency, and uncertainty 
My point in all this isn’t to endorse the idea that in general hate speech doesn’t 
contribute significantly to dehumanization, it’s to say we don’t know to what ex-
tent hate speech is involved here, and that if there are milieus in which it’s a driv-
ing causal force, we know little about what it is within those milieus that facili-
tates the uptake of the dehumanizing attitudes being promulgated in hate speech. 
None of this should detract from the primary implications of Murrow and Mur-
row’s theses about how cognition is altered for subjects affected by dehumaniza-
tion. Dehumanization is dangerous; it’s plausible to suppose that it’s some part of 
the explanation of mass state violence against ethnic outgroups, both in cases like 
Nazi Germany, where racialized justifications for violence were espoused forth-
rightly, and in cases like contemporary mass incarceration in the United States, 
where racialized violence runs amok even while overtly identity-prejudicial jus-
tifications for this state of affairs are largely confined to the political fringes. How-
ever, the gravity of such wrongs and the urgency of redress means that the stand-
ards we apply, in assessing explanations of how the wrongs occur and what re-
dress would require, should be more exacting, not less. In this I’m echoing Henry 
Louis Gates’ worry, that calls to curb racist speech may encourage societies to 
downplay the deeper, less easily remediable, economic underpinnings of identity-
based social hierarchies.9 I’m also betraying a sympathy for Martha Minow’s 
claim that “if the goal is to eradicate the dehumanization of the hated group, at-
tention would more fruitfully turn to... the surrounding social traditions and 
practices that have made and continue to make that group subject to dehumani-
zation.”10 These ideas aren’t new, but they bear repeating. 
                                                          
9 Henry Louis Gates, Let them talk: why civil liberties pose no threat to civil rights, NEW REPUBLIC 37 (1993), 43-
49, at 43. 
10 Martha Minow, Regulating hatred: whose speech, whose crimes, whose power? An essay for Kenneth Karst, UCLA 
LAW REVIEW 47 (2000), 1253-77, at 1274. 
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I should close by noting one area in which claims about hate speech’s dehuman-
izing influence are not so conjectural, but instead empirically well-informed. In-
ternational relations theorists and political philosophers trying to diagnose the 
causes of mass atrocity crimes, as in Rwanda in 1994, have identified intervention 
in dehumanizing propaganda as being, in at least some cases, a key preventative 
strategy.11 The intersection between this work, with its empirical insights into 
the origins of dehumanized attitudes (at least in certain kinds of contexts), and 
Murrow and Murrow’s account of how exactly dehumanization modifies the cog-
nition of affected subjects, is likely to be a fruitful space for inquiry. 
                                                          
11 See for instance: Susan Benesch, The ghost of causation in international speech crimes cases in Predrag Dojcinovic 
(Ed.), PROPAGANDA, WAR CRIMES TRIALS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (London: Routledge, 2012); Lynne 
Tirrell, Genocidal language games in Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan (Eds.), SPEECH AND HARM: 
CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
